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THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
by
Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.*
T HE ORIGINAL thirty-four Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted by the
American Bar Association on July 9, 1924.1 The draft, which was approved
with only one minor modification,' was prepared by a Special Committee of
the American Bar Association consisting of five members, including its chair-
man, Chief Justice Willam Howard Taft.3 A brief review of the background of
this committee may assist in understanding the nature of the problems which
led to the formulation of rules of judicial conduct, as embodied both in the
original canons and in the recent Code.
In 1905 the American Bar Association appointed a Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics. In 1908, as a result of the work of this committee, the first
thirty-two of the canons were adopted in their original form. The committee,
in the course of its investigation, solicited suggestions regarding judicial con-
duct as well as professional conduct. It collated this material, and, in the pre-
liminary report which its secretary prepared for the information of the
comnmittee members, there was a section devoted to the ethics of the bench.
The committee, however, did not consider the time ripe for its inclusion, and
upon a close and careful inspection of the resolution under which it was ap-
pointed, concluded that it did not have the authority to incorporate in the
canons a section on canons of judicial ethics.4
However, as early as 1917 the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association adopted a resolution "[tjhat the suggestion of the
propriety of the formulation and promulgation of canons for the judiciary be
referred to the Judiciary Section of this Association for consideration in order,
if the way be clear, to the appointment [sic] of a committee to take the matter
under advisement."' Four years later, while still awaiting a reply from the
Judiciary Section,' the committee report expressed justifiable asperity, and
referred to "the duty and expediency of action by the Association as a whole
* B.A., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Memphis, Tennessee. Although the
author was a member of the Special Committee of the American Bar Association which
drafted the Code, and is a member and former chairman of the Association's Standing Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility which will be charged with interpreting
it, the views expressed are his own and should not be attributed to either of these com-
mittees.
149 A.B.A. REP. 65-71 (1924).
" Upon the recommendation of a Special Committee of the Judicial Section appointed
to study the proposed Canons, the following words were, with the consent of the drafting
committee, deleted from Canon 13: "And if such a course can reasonably be avoided, he
should not sit in litigation where a near relative appears before him as counsel." Id. at 67.
But cf. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (d) (ii) [hereinafter cited as
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT) which requires a judge to disqualify himself under such cir-
cumstances.
347 A.B.A. REP. 160 (1922). See also 49 A.B.A. REP. 68 (1924). The appointment
of the committee was authorized by the Executive Committee of the American Bar Associ-
ation. 47 A.B.A. REP. 112 (1922).
' This summary is taken from 49 A.B.A. REP. 67-68 (1924). For a fuller discussion of
the background of the original Canons of Professional Ethics, see Armstrong, The Code of
Professional Responsibility, 1 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 277 (1971).
'42 A.B.A. REP. 82 (1917).
646 A.B.A. REP. 303-04 (1921). The name of the committee had been changed to the
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances.
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with reference to the matter of judicial scandals."' This reference was appar-
ently prompted by the adoption of a resolution of censure of Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis for "engaging in private employment and accepting private
emolument while holding the position of a federal judge and receiving a salary
from the federal government . . . ."' John M. Harlan of Illinois, who spoke
during the course of the debate on the censure motion, came closest to the
heart of the problem when he said: "Perhaps unconsciously to itself the Ameri-
can Bar Association is on trial."9
It was apparent that while the American Bar Association might deal with
the occasional flagrant case, it could not possibly concern itself with the indi-
vidual conduct of every judge throughout the country; and yet the difference
was merely one of degree. The obvious solution was to establish standards of
conduct for judges by which they could be guided in performing their ju-
dicial duties, and also in their day-to-day activities which might affect or re-
flect upon the performance of those duties. That goal was the charge given
to the special committee appointed in 1922.'0
A draft of the proposed canons was completed in January 1923 and published
in the February 1923 issue of the American Bar Association Journal,"' with
an invitation to readers to comment. A redraft of the proposed canons was then
submitted to the Association at its annual meeting of that year," and, with
the concurrence of the committee, the proposed canons were referred to the
Judicial Section for its consideration."
A careful comparison of this early draft" with the version finally presented
for adoption15 is revealing. One additional ancient precedent, taken from the
Magna Carta, was added. " There are numerous changes in language, including
nine instances where a pronoun is substituted for the word "judge" or its plural.
7 ld. at 305.
' Id. at 61. The authority for this action was said to be art. IV of the constitution of
the American Bar Association, which gave as one of the objectives of the association "to
uphold the honor of the profession of the law." But cf. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canons 5, 6, and accompanying comments.
146 A.B.A. REP. 66 (1921). Judge Landis was charged with accepting a salary of
$42,500 a year from an association of baseball clubs while receiving a salary of $7,500 a
year as a federal judge. See id. at 61-62.
0 As the committee said in its final report:
The situation ran along until three years ago, when a very forceful illus-
tration occurred in the action of this Association itself at Cincinnati, when
it proceeded to pass a resolution in disapproval of the conduct of an in-
dividual judge. It was then suggested that it would be much fairer and much
better if the Association, instead of picking out individual cases for con-
demnation, should express its opinion of what the members of the American
Bar Association expect from those who sit upon the Bench, to the end that
its Canons of Professional Ethics should be as specific with respect to the
conduct of judges as with respect to the conduct of members of the Bar.
49 A.B.A. REP. 68 (1924).
119 A.B.A.J. 73 (1923).
1248 A.B.A. REP. 452-60 (1923).
"Id. at 74-76. It is interesting to note that the only suggestion made from the floor
at the time of this action was that Canon 9 be amended so as to direct a judge to "protect,
while they are in court, entering or leaving the same, parties litigant, witnesses and all
others whose duties require their attendance upon court, from annoyance and humiliation
by picture men and news gatherers." Id. at 76. This suggestion was not adopted but later
blossomed into Canon 35. See 62 A.B.A. REP. 350-52, 767 (1937).
149 A.B.A.J. 73 (1923).
'558 A.B.A. REP. 711-19 (1933).
"MAGNA CARTA XLV, in ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICs, Ancient Precedents.
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The original canon dealing with Promises of Candidates was expanded and re-
designated Canon 30; Canon 27, dealing with Personal Investments and Re-
lations, was omitted entirely;"1 Canons 4 and 24 were combined into a new
Canon 3, as were Canons 8 and 9 into a new Canon 7; Canons 17 and 30 were
added, dealing with Ex Parte Communications and Candidacy for Office;
Canon 13 was substantially contracted, and Canon 15 substantially expanded.
On the whole, the result seems to reveal a tightening, strengthening, and
clarifying of the canons, which resulted in a much improved product.
As previously noted, the final draft was adopted with only one deletion,"e
and, thus, the Canons of Judicial Ethics became the standards established by
the American Bar Association for the conduct of judges. For the next forty-
six years their history was relatively uneventful, with one exception. In 1933
amendments were adopted adding an additional sentence to Canon 28 and
modifying Canon 30, so as to prohibit a judge from engaging in party poli-
tics,'" and to require his resignation if he became a candidate for non-judicial
office." In 1937, on the recommendation of the Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances,2' the words "A judge" were substituted for the pronoun
"he" in seventeen of the Canons, including six where the opposite change had
been made from the first draft in 1923. Two additional Canons, 35 and 36,
dealing with Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings and Conduct of
Court Proceedings respectively, were also adopted.'
In 1950 Canon 28 was further modified in order to permit an incumbent
judge standing for re-election to engage in certain limited partisan political
activities in support of his candidacy." Canon 35 was amended in 1952 by
adding the word "televising" and the phrase "distract the witness in giving
his testimony" to the first paragraph, and adding an additional sentence per-
mitting the broadcasting and televising of ceremonial portions of naturali-
zation proceedings under appropriate restrictions." Further minor amendments
to the same Canon were made in 1963.'
Since 1931 the interpretation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics has been in
the hands of what is now the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association." From the time when it was
"7But cf. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2B, 5C(3) which appear to restore
these provisions.
s See note 2 supra.
"9 58 A.B.A. REP. 178 (1933); Cf. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 7A(1).
2058 A.B.A. REP. 179 (1933); Cl. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3).
21 62 A.B.A. REP. 767 (1937). This report also resulted in substantial revisions of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
"Id. at 352. In view of the subsequent history of Canon 35, it is interesting to note
that the committee's report was not read and there was no discussion on any of the amend-
ments.
21375 A.B.A. REP. 121, 229 (1950); Cf. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2).
2477 A.B.A. REP. 110, 257 (1952). See also id. at 173, 607, for concurring committee
reports, which were likewise adopted apparently without debate. Id. at 114, 429. But in
1963, when a Special Committee on Proposed Revision of Judicial Canon 35 filed an ex-
tensive report upholding the validity of Canon 35 and recommending only minor modifica-
tions in it, a major debate was precipitated which nevertheless resulted in the adoption of
the recommendation. See 88 A.B.A. REP. 115, 305 (1963).
2"88 A.B.A. REP. 115 (1963).
26See 61 A.B.A. REP. 993 (1936). ABA By-Laws art. X, § 7(i), as amended. During
this period the committee has been named variously the Committee on Professional Ethics
[Vol. 26
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given that authority through December 11, 1965, the committee issued 277
formal opinions" of which only thirty-eight interpret one or more of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, while sixteen of the Canons have no interpretative
opinions at all.' Thus, it is quite apparent that the major emphasis has been
placed upon the conduct of the bar and not that of the bench. But a series of
events which constitute a striking repetition of history soon changed all that.
In 1964 a special committee was appointed and authorized "to study.., the
adequacy and effectiveness of the present Canons of Professional Ethics, in-
cluding their observance and enforcement, and to make such recommendations
for changes therein as may be deemed appropriate to encourage and maintain
the highest level of ethical standards by the legal profession."" No mention was
made of judicial ethics. In 1969 the committee filed its final report, which
was adopted, and thus the Code of Professional Responsibility came into being."
But again, no reference was made to judicial ethics, and the Code, by its terms,
applies to judges only to the extent that they are themselves members of the
bar.
Nevertheless, the formulation and adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility furnished the background for the instigation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, just as the adoption of the original Canons of Ethics in 1908
resulted in the adoption of Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924. As a result of
a series of occurrences, public interest in judicial conduct was at a new height.
The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recognized
this in its Formal Opinion 322,1 which summarized virtually all of the com-
mittee's previous opinions on the subject, and concluded:
The public is conscious of problems of possible conflicts of interest at the
present time. The public is rightfully concerned with the interests of legisla-
tors, of lawyers, of businessmen and the basis on which their decisions are
made. The public rightfully is interested in the appearance of impropriety on
the part of its judges, and the public's judges should conform to the standards
set forth many years ago by the thoughtful members of the legal profession
and codified in the Canons of Judicial Ethics."2
Shortly thereafter the committee was asked to express its view as to "the
ethical propriety of acceptance by a judge of an annual salary from a tax
exempt foundation.""3 It declined to do so, pointing out that it did "not have
any procedures for investigation or determining facts, as a court or a grievance
committee does."' Stating that the facts furnished by the inquirer were in-
and Grievances, the Committee on Professional Ethics, and by its present name. For its full
history, see ABA OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1 (1967).27See ABA OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 26. December 11, 1965,
is the date of the last reported opinion in the bound volume.
28 Id. at 198-229. The remaining opinions, of course, interpret the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics.
2989 A.B.A. REP. 383 (1964). The italics, which are in the original, indicate words
substituted by amendment for the words "a high level."
194 A.B.A. REP. 389 (1969). For a full account of the development of the Code, see
Armstrong, supra note 4, at 280-82.
3194 A.B.A. REP. app. at 7 (1969).
"Id. at 11-12.
' ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion No. 1117
(July 20, 1969).3 4 Id.
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sufficient to afford a basis for a conclusion, the committee merely referred to
Formal Opinion 322 as affording general guidelines for judicial conduct.
Only four days later, the committee issued Informal Opinion 11145 in the
form of an advisory opinion to the president of the American Bar Association
on the subject: "Did the conduct of a former federal judge in his relation to
a Family Foundation violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics?" Although the
federal judge was not identified, the committee rendered its opinion "in view
of the importance to the profession and in recognition of the public interest
in the controversy," and despite the fact that "during the pendency of the con-
troversy, the judge resigned his judicial position. "
The committee, reiterating its lack of fact-finding and investigative powers,
nevertheless proceeded to state the facts upon which its opinion was based,
taking them from the judge's letter of resignation." The judge, after his ap-
pointment, had accepted a $20,000 payment from the family foundation of a
financier with whom he had previously had professional connections, and who
was under investigation for possible criminal violation of the federal securities
laws. The financier was subsequently indicted and convicted on one count, the
conviction being subject to review by the court upon which the judge sat,
although that court, without his participation, refused to review the case. The
committee then cited eight of the Canons of Judicial Ethics' under which it
reached the conclusion that "the conduct of the judge described in the state-
ment of the facts, was clearly contrary to the Canons of Judicial Ethics ....""
The parallel between this situation and that which gave rise earlier to the
adoption of the original Canons of Judicial Ethics is readily apparent.' Three
weeks after Informal Opinion 1114 was issued, the board of governors of the
American Bar Association approved the creation of a Special Committee on
Standards of Judicial Conduct. This committee was to consist of not more than
twelve members appointed by the president of the American Bar Association.
Its purpose was to study and report to the board of governors and the house of
delegates on the adequacy and effectiveness of the present Canons of Judicial
Ethics, including their observance and enforcement. The committee was ex-
pected to make such recommendations for reformation of the canons as it
deemed appropriate, in an effort to encourage and maintain the highest level
of ethical standards by the judiciary.4
'ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion No. 1114
(July 24, 1969). Note that although this opinion bears an earlier number, Informal Opin-
ion 1117 antedates it. Although Informal Opinions are ordinarily summarized in the Amer-
ican Bar Association Journal, this does not appear to have been done in this particular case.
Copies of the opinion can be obtained from ABA Headquarters. It was distributed to a
limited mailing list upon publication.
"Id.; see R. SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT 265 (1972).
" The committee noted: "Any substantial difference between these stated facts and any
facts that may be subsequently disclosed might change our conclusion." Informal Opinion
No. 1114, supra note 35.
18 ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Nos. 1, 4, 13, 24, 25, 26, 31, 34.
3' Informal Opinion No. 1114, supra note 35. The opinion was unanimous on the part
of those participating. The chairman disqualified himself from participation.
4 See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
41 95 A.B.A. REP. 165 (1970). The chairman of the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility was subsequently made an ex-officio member of the committee.
Id. at 168.
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The preliminary report of the committee2 reflects the fact that before be-
ginning its task the committee requested suggestions from each state bar associa-
tion, major local bar associations, the Appellate Judges' Conference, the Na-
tional Conference of Special Court Judges, major news media organizations,
members of the Conference of Chief Justices, each federal judge, law school
deans, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, and the Institute of Judicial
Administration. In addition, the reporter for the committee examined judicial
standards in state constitutions and statutes, as well as the canons of judicial
ethics and standards of conduct for judges of the various states and the reso-
lutions of the Federal Judicial Conference. Based upon this survey, the com-
mittee concluded that it should first concentrate on important matters that
were "dealt with inadequately or not at all in the existing canons, including con-
flict of interest, financial reporting and public disclosure, and non-adjudicatory
activities of judges such as law teaching and serving as officers or directors of
business corporations, before turning to the revision of the present canons.""
Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the committee decided to formu-
late and submit specific conclusions, rather than written proposed canons, for
the consideration of the bench, bar, public, and the media.'
These specific conclusions, applicable only to full-time judges, were formu-
lated in nine statements dealing with judicial duties, quasi-judicial activities,
civic and charitable activities, fiduciary relationships, personal relationships,
compensation and expenses, disqualification, and legal and political activity,
together with a final section dealing with the effective date of compliance. Four-
teen thousand copies of this draft were mailed to the members of the house of
delegates of the American Bar Association, members of the Section of Judicial
Administration, members of the Conference of Trial and Appellate Judges,
and various other individuals and groups whose comments would be particu-
larly helpful. Public hearings were held during the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association in St. Louis in 1970, and those who could not attend
were invited to submit their views in writing. Thereafter, it was contemplated
that the committee would turn at once to the actual drafting of proposed new
canons on the matters which were dealt with in this first draft, as well as an
examination and, where necessary, revision of the remaining existing canons,
the end product to be a new "Code of Ethics for Judges" which would be a
comprehensive and symmetrical whole.
Although two more years were to pass before this objective was to be
achieved, the proposals of 1970 constitute the first publicly available draft of
what ultimately became the Code of Judicial Conduct. As such, it furnishes a
starting point from which the evolution of certain basic concepts of the Code
may be viewed. A comparison of this early version with the finished code is en-
lightening both as to those principles which remained firmly fixed during its de-
4295 A.B.A. REP. 1048 (1970).
4 3 
Id.
4The omitted canons are 3, 5, 7-22, 35, 36.
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velopment and those which were modified as a result of being tested against
the day-to-day problems of the sitting judge.'
Such a comparison reveals that as early as August 1970 the committee had
already developed the framework upon which all of its subsequent work was to
be based. A further consideration of the committee's activities after the formu-
lation of the preliminary draft will serve to corroborate this view.
At the conclusion of its 1970 annual meeting, Edward L. Wright became
president of the American Bar Association, and voiced his support for the
committee's project:
Confidence in the courts is vital to the stability of our society. The public's
confidence has been shaken in recent years by occasional widely publicized
examples of questionable conduct. The public is entitled to know that judges
respect and conform to higher standards.
The overwhelming majority of judges want to do right and deplore judicial
misconduct, and it is desirable that they have a modern statement of the norms
and guides expected of them so they can conform fully. We will also welcome
new and clearer standards that will permit them to know just what is expected
of them. The Committee's proposals when perfected and adopted will make an
important contribution to preserving the prestige of the courts and maintain-
ing this country's heritage of judicial independence and integrity.'
Encouraged by this support, the committee immediately embarked upon
a second tentative draft, which, however, was not completed by the time of the
mid-winter, 1971, meeting of the American Bar Association. The committee
merely filed a progress report,47 which predicted final submission of the Code
at the 1972 annual meeting, a forecast which the committee was ultimately
able to fulfill.
The second tentative draft was published in May 1971' under the title
' The first standard of the preliminary draft is embodied substantially unchanged in the
opening sentence and subsection A(1) under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
but the Code elaborates considerably upon that basic concept. The second standard is cov-
ered by Canon 4 of the Code, which somewhat broadens the scope of permissible individual
activities in support of improvements in the administration of justice and the law. The
third standard is almost identical with paragraph B under Canon 5 of the Code, which,
however, adds a prohibition against giving investment advice. The fourth standard is the
same as paragraph D under Canon 5 of the Code, except that "member of his family" is
defined. The fifth standard corresponds to paragraph B under Canon 2 of the Code, except
that an absolute prohibition against voluntary testimony as a character witness has been
added. The sixth standard is somewhat modified by paragraph C under Canon 5 of the
Code, which is more liberal in permitting participation in outside business activities, par-
ticularly under the alternative provided. The seventh standard coincides with the text under
Canon 6 of the Code, except that the report is to be made at least annually rather than semi-
annually. No report of expense reimbursement is required in view of the fact that excessive
expense payments are defined as compensation. The eighth standard is carried forward in
paragraphs C and D under Canon 3 of the Code, which also deals with disqualification other
than on account of financial interest, and makes disclosure on the part of the judge volun-
tary rather than mandatory. The ninth standard is divided between paragraphs E, F, and G
under Canon 5 and paragraph A under Canon 7 of the Code, under the first of which
service as an arbitrator is strictly prohibited. The final provision of the preliminary draft
under the heading "Effective Date of Compliance" is substantially the same as that which
appears under the same heading in the Code.
4696 A.B.A. REP. 733 (1971). This quotation is taken from the committee's report,
where the source is not given. After serving as ABA president, Mr. Wright became a mem-
ber of the committee. Id. at 566.4I Id. at 310.
48ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS (Tent. Draft, May 1971).
[Vol. 26
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"Canons of Judicial Ethics," and copies were immediately sent to 15,000
lawyers, judges, media representatives, and other interested individuals. As a
result of the distribution of this draft, more than five hundred suggested re-
visions were received from twenty-seven committees of bar associations and
other groups, from special committees of judicial organizations, and from
individuals.' 9 All of these were considered, and many adopted, in formulating
the final draft of the Code, a preliminary version of which was completed in
January 1972 and distributed to the house of delegates prior to the mid-winter
meeting in that year. Several members of the house of delegates made sugges-
tions, some of which were embodied in the final draft which was released for
general circulation in May 1972.0
This draft, entitled "Code of Judicial Conduct," consists of a preface, seven
canons with text and commentary, a section on compliance, and a final section
on the effective date of compliance. The alteration in the title from that of the
tentative draft is apparently in recognition of the fact that the Code contains
more than merely canons of judicial ethics, embracing also standards of con-
duct and suggested means of meeting those standards. This fact is made explicit
in the preface, which states: "In the judgment of the Association this Code,
consisting of statements of norms denominated canons, the accompanying text
setting forth specific rules, and the commentary, states the standards that judges
should observe. The canons and text establish mandatory standards unless
otherwise indicated."51
The preface then goes on to express the hope that all jurisdictions will
adopt the Code and establish effective disciplinary procedures for its enforce-
ment. 2 The Code itself does not undertake to provide procedures either for
its implementation or enforcement. It merely sets forth principles, standards,
and objectives by which the conduct of judges should be governed if they are
to fulfill their judicial duties.9 A statement of each of the canons, with a brief
summary of the accompanying material, will make this clear.
Canon 1. A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary. The text under this canon is a rearrangement of that which first
appeared in the tentative draft. It requires a judge not only to observe, but to
assist in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct.
A proviso that the provisions of the Code should be construed to further this
objective is also included.
Canon 2. A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impro-
priety in All His Activities. The text is substantially that of Canon 5 of the
4 9 ABA COMM. AND SECTION REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDA-
TION AND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT item
4 (Aug. 1972).50ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (Final Draft, May 1972). Although only the third draft was prepared for gen-
eral circulation, this was the thirteenth draft considered by the committee, which had held
twelve two-day meetings since October 1969. See ABA COMM. AND SECTION REPORTS TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 49, item 4.
5'CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preface.
52See W. BRAITHWARTIE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? (1971).5 1 In this sense the tide is perhaps a misnomer as the Code governs the conduct of judges
both on and off the bench.
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tentative draft, except that the word "voluntarily" has been inserted in the
prohibition against testifying as a character witness. This is explained by a
sentence added to the commentary which makes it clear that the canon "does
not afford him a privilege against testifying in response to an official sum-
mons."4 The first paragraph of the text requires respect for, and compliance
with, law and appropriate public conduct. The second, which reflects section 5
of the preliminary draft, warns against the influence or apparent influence of
extraneous relationships upon judicial actions.
Canon 3. A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and
Diligently. This canon covers the entire range of judicial activities, which it
provides shall take precedence over all other activities of a judge, a concept
derived from section 1 of the preliminary draft. These duties are those pre-
scribed by law, which presumably includes common law, statute, and rule of
court. The text under this canon is divided into sections on adjudicative re-
sponsibilities, administrative responsibilities, disqualification, and remittal of
disqualification.
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities. There are seven subheadings under this
section. The first of those requires that a judge not only be faithful to the law,
but maintain his competence in it, as well as his independence of judgment.
While the term "faithful to the law" is reminiscent of the generalities of the
pre-existing canons, the requirement that a judge maintain professional compe-
tence injects an entirely new idea into the Code, derived primarily from the
Code of Professional Responsibility, where a similar requirement is established
for lawyers."
The next four subsections require a judge to maintain order and decorum;
to be patient, dignified, and courteous towards all with whom he deals, and
require similar conduct of those subject to his direction and control; to afford
every interested party a full hearing according to law; and to dispose promptly
of the business of the court. In these days of disruptive trial practices, these
are more than mere admonitions. "
Section 4 prohibits the initiation or consideration of ex parte communications
in a pending or impending proceeding, but makes one significant exception.
It permits a judge to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to the case before him if he gives adequate notice to the parties
and affords them an opportunity to respond. This exception did not appear in
the corresponding section of the tentative draft, and, therefore, presumably
resulted from reaction to the strict prohibition embodied in that draft. The
commentary makes it clear that it is intended to permit limited consultation
by the judge with law teachers and others similarly qualified. Of course, a
judge may always consult with his fellow judges, and the filing of amicus
curiae briefs is encouraged.
54 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Commentary.
"'ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6, Disciplinary Rule 6-101.
See also id. Canon 8, Ethical Consideration 8-6, where it is said, "Judges .. .ought to be
persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament."
56 See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN DEALING WITH TRIAL
DISRUPTIONS (1971); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1970).
[Vol. 26
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Section 6 requires a judge to abstain from public comment upon pending or
impending proceedings before him, and to require similar abstention from
those under his control. He may, however, make public statements in the
course of his official duties or explain for public information the procedures
of the court."7
The final section under this heading generally prohibits the broadcasting,
televising, recording, or photographing of court proceedings. Exceptions are
made for the perpetuation of a record or other purpose of judicial administra-
tion, for the publicizing of investive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings,
and for instructional purposes in educational institutions with the consent of the
parties and participating witnesses when the means of recording is not distract-
ing and the recording will not be exhibited until after the proceeding is con-
cluded and all appeals exhausted. This last exception is a departure from the
language of the tentative draft, which made no mention of exhausting appeals.
Obviously the final version is much more restrictive, although less so than the
pre-existing Canon 35.
B. Administrative Responsibilities. The first two subsections under this head-
ing require diligence and competence of the judge in the discharge of his
administrative responsibilities, and also require him to facilitate the perform-
ance of such duties by other judges and court officials and to require similar
standards of those under his direction and control. Here again, as in the case
of adjudicative duties, the requirement of competence is a new concept.
Section 3 requires a judge to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against a lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which he may become
aware. Obviously this includes not only such conduct in a proceeding pending
before him, where he may act directly through a citation for contempt, but
also conduct which may come to his attention indirectly, where, as the com-
mentary makes clear, he has an obligation to report such misconduct to the
appropriate disciplinary body.'
Section 4 deals with a judge's power of appointment, admonishing that
all such appointments should be on a basis of merit. It prohibits nepotism,
favoritism, unnecessary appointment, and excessive compensation, which rule,
as the commentary says, cannot be modified by consent of the parties.
C. Disqualification. This section originated in section 8 of the preliminary
draft, which provided for mandatory, but, in the case of an insubstantial in-
terest, waivable, disqualification. Full disclosure was required in any case where
directly or indirectly the judge had an interest, however slight (including an
interest in a mutual fund having a substantial interest) in a party or in the
res or issue in controversy. This was considerably expanded in the tentative
draft, which laid down the general rule that a judge should disqualify himself
in any case in which his impartiality might be questioned, and cited specific
examples of instances which would provide an adequate basis for disqualifi-
cation.
57 Cf. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1966).5 8 ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 167 (Final Draft, June 1970).
19721
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The final draft adopted in substance the language of the tentative draft con-
cerning the first two instances of specific grounds for disqualification. In the
first, "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party" was substituted for "fixed
belief concerning the merits." The second was expanded to include participation
as a lawyer or material witness by a former legal associate of the judge who
was concerned with the matter during the period of such association, except,
as the commentary points out, where the association was in government service,
unless such association might furnish a reasonable basis for questioning the
judge's impartiality. 9 The next two subsections of the tentative draft were also
adopted, but with significant changes and in reverse order. The family financial
interest of which the judge must take cognizance was limited to that of his
spouse or minor child living in his household. The word "trustee" was added
and the phrase "an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding" was substituted for "a substantial interest in the matter
in controversy or the affairs of a party to the proceeding."' The obligation
of the judge to inform himself about his own personal and fiduciary financial
interests was made absolute, and the requirement of reasonable effort to acquire
similar information as to members of his family was limited to his spouse and
minor children residing in his household. The definition of "financial interest"
was not limited to an economic interest, and the exceptions recognize that the
interest of a judge in securities held by a mutual fund may be substantial if he
participates in the management of the fund. The offices which may be held in
charitable and similar organizations without acquiring an interest in securities
held by them were not limited to fiduciary offices." The words "government
securities" were substituted for "government bonds" in the final subsection.
It is apparent that this particular section of the Code underwent a long
and intricate evolution before reaching its final form. Obvious alternatives must
have been considered and rejected, such as requiring full public disclosure of
a judge's financial interests or requiring a substantial interest as a basis for
disqualification. " There are proponents of these and other possible solutions
to this knotty problem, and that which the drafting committee has selected no
doubt will not please everyone. It appears to be, however, a reasonable and
workable compromise between the right which a judge shares with every citi-
zen to privacy in his personal affairs, "3 and the right of those who appear before
him to a fair and impartial trial.
D. Remittal of Disqualification. This section provides for voluntary and dis-
cretionary disclosure by the judge of an economic interest or family relationship
which he believes to be insubstantial or immaterial, but which gave rise to his
disqualification. Based upon this disclosure, a waiver by the parties and lawyers
in writing, independently of the judge's participation, agreeing that his in-
terest is immaterial or insubstantial, will allow the judge to proceed to hear
5' In class actions the parties are the named representatives of the class, according to the
commentary.
"The judge and his spouse are also brought within the direct prohibition of the sec-
tion, thus eliminating a possible ambiguity.
6'But ct. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(3).
"See Judicial Ethics Symposium, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1970).
"eSe CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(6).
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and dispose of the case. The waiver then becomes a part of the record in the
case. This provision appears to follow substantially that of the tentative draft,
although the language has been improved and the procedure somewhat simpli-
fied. In the commentary, the reference to class actions has been omitted,
although it would still seem to apply. A provision was added that where a
party is not immediately available, the judge may proceed upon counsel's
written assurance that his client's written consent will be subsequently filed.
The importance of this waiver provision in jurisdictions having a single judge
or others having crowded dockets is apparent.
Canon 4. A Judge May Engage in Activities To Improve the Law, the Legal
System, and the Administration of Justice. Subject to the proper performance
of his judicial duties and the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety, this
canon permits a judge to speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other
activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of jus-
tice. These are defined as "quasi-judicial" 4 activities. "Other activities" include
appearances at public hearings before executive and legislative bodies or
officials. Private consultation, however, is limited to matters concerning the
administration of justice, and serving as a member, officer, or director of, or
assisting in the raising or management, but not public solicitation, of funds for,
or contacting public or private fund-granting agencies on behalf of, organiza-
tions devoted to those purposes.
This was a broadening of the provisions embodied in the tentative draft,
as the authority to appear before public hearings on matters other than the
administration of justice and to contact fund-granting agencies has been added,
and the word "assist" substituted for "endorse" in connection with fund-raising
efforts. The commentary points out that a judge is in a unique position to con-
tribute in these fields, and should be encouraged to do so either independently
or through appropriate organizations. Two other paragraphs of commentary
which appeared in the tentative draft but are inappropriate to the final text
were omitted.
Canon 5. A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities To Minimize
the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties. Under this canon there are
seven subdivisions of varying significance. The first permits a judge to write,
lecture, teach, or speak on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and
other social and recreational activities if they do not detract from the dignity
of his office or interfere with his judicial duties. The commentary recognizes
that the isolation of judges from society is neither possible nor wise.
The next section covers civic and charitable activities. This is an area which
has been the subject of much dispute. The Code takes the position that a judge
may participate in such activities, and may serve as an officer, director, trustee,
or non-legal advisor of an organization so engaged, provided always that they
do not interfere with his judicial duties or reflect upon his impartiality. How-
ever, he should not do so if the organization is likely to be engaged in proceed-
ings which would ordinarily come before him, or is regularly engaged in
adversary proceedings in any court. Nor may he solicit funds for such an or-
4Canon 5 deals with "extra-judicial activities."
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ganization or lend the prestige of his office for that purpose or give investment
advice, although he may serve and be listed as an officer, director, or trustee,
even though the board of which he is a member passes upon investments, and
may attend fund-raising events so long as he is not a speaker or guest of honor."
Financial activities, the subject of the next section, is perhaps the most
difficult field with which the Code deals. The initial provision admonishes a
judge to refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect upon
his impartiality, interfere with his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position,
or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come
before him. Subject to this he may hold investments and engage in other re-
munerative activities, but should not serve as an officer, director, manager,
advisor, or employee of any business. Clearly, he should arrange his invest-
ments and other financial interests so as to minimize any risk of disqualification.
He should not use information acquired by him in his judicial capacity for non-
judicial purposes. He is not, however, required to disclose his income, debts,
or investments except as provided in the Code.6
In theory, these requirements should be strictly enforced, and that was the
position taken in the preliminary and tentative drafts. But such vigorous appli-
cation presupposes adequate judicial compensation, and unfortunately this is
not always the case. In some, if not many, state systems, the salary scale is such
that a judge simply cannot live and support a family without access to outside
sources of revenue. As the commentary notes, the remedy is to secure adequate
judicial salaries. But this is often more easily said than done. Therefore, the
Code provides for "[j]urisdictions that do not provide adequate judicial salaries
but are willing to allow full-time judges to supplement their income through
commercial activities" an alternative provision omitting the prohibition against
serving as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business,
and substituting an explicit authorization to engage in other remunerative ac-
tivity, including the operation of a business. Even then, a caveat is inserted
against certain types of businesses such as banks, public utilities, insurance
companies, and others affected with a public interest.
The Code, following the preliminary draft and the tentative draft, prohibits
a judge or a member of his family residing in his household from accepting
a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a party or other person whose interests have
come before him." Exceptions are made for gifts incident to a public testi-
monial; books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis; invitations to
bar-related activities or those devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice; ordinary social hospitality; a gift,
bequest, or loan from a relative; a loan upon ordinary terms from a regular
lending institution; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the usual terms.
Under Canon 5, following section 4 of the preliminary draft, a judge is
prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, guardian, or other fiduciary,
except for a member of his family, as there defined, and then only if such ser-
'These provisions originated in § 3 of the preliminary draft. The last two, however, do
not appear there or in the tentative draft.
66 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3D, 6C.
" All other gifts in excess of $100 must be reported in accordance with Canon 6C.
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vice will not interfere with the proper cor duct of his judicial duties. He should
not serve if it is likely that as such fiduciary he will be engaged in proceedings
that would likely come before him. If he does serve, he is subject to the same
restrictions that apply to him in his persona! capacity."
Finally, under this canon a judge is prohibited from practicing law, acting as
an arbitrator or mediator, or accepting appointments to a governmental com-
mittee, commission, or other position concerned with issues of fact or policy
other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice. 9 However, a judge may represent his country, state, or locality on
ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, or cultural
activities.
Canon 6. A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received
from Quasi-Judicial and Extra-Judicial Activities. Canons 4 and 5 presuppose
that a judge may receive compensation for quasi-judicial and extra-judicial
activities, and Canon 6 makes this explicit, provided the amount is reasonable
and the source does not give the appearance of influencing him in his judicial
duties or other impropriety. However, the amount and source of such com-
pensation, and the date, place, and nature of the activity for which it was
received must be embodied in a public report filed at least annually with the
clerk of the court or other designated office. Expense reimbursement in excess
of actual expenditures is classified as compensation, and gifts in excess of one
hundred dollars must be similarly reported."0 Income of a spouse attributed to
the judge by operation of community property law is specifically exempted.
This provision differs from section 7 of the preliminary draft, which required
a similar report to be made within six months after the payment was received,
and also required the reporting of the source (but not the amount) of all ex-
pense reimbursement.
Canon 7. A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to
His Judicial Office. The preliminary draft dealt with this entire subject in a
single sentence: "He should not engage in political activity except to the ex-
tent necessarily involved in obtaining or retaining judicial office through an
elective political process.""
The difficulty with this approach is that a great many judges in order to
retain their position on the bench must prevail in periodic elections, and the
extent of political activity necessary to do this varies widely. Therefore, some
guidelines are required as to just how far an incumbent judge may go in his po-
litical activities in order to retain his office.
The tentative draft endeavored to supply those guidelines. This draft made
the restrictions applicable to a "judge or candidate for elective judicial office,"'
"See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.
60 The commentary gives as a reason for this latter prohibition, "the demands on judicial
manpower created by today's crowded dockets and the need to protect the courts from in-
volvement in extra-judicial matters that may prove to be controversial." CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5G, Commentary.
'0CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C (4) (c).
7195 A.B.A. REP. 1048, 1050 (1970).
72 Obviously an amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility will be necessary
to implement this provision, as the Code of Judicial Conduct applies only to incumbent
judges, not to lawyers seeking election as judges.
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thus putting both candidates on an equal footing. It then laid down six rules,
dealing with the conduct of a judge who is not a candidate, of a judge who be-
comes a candidate for a non-judicial office, and of a judge who is a candidate for
a judicial office, and the conduct of those under his control. The provisions of
the tentative draft overlapped confusingly in a way which was only resolved
when the final draft dealt with them under the two headings of "Political
Conduct in General" and "Campaign Conduct."
Under the first heading, a judge or candidate may at no time act as a leader
or hold any office in a political organization, make speeches in support of
such an organization or its candidate, or publicly endorse its candidate for
public office."3 He may not solicit funds, make a contribution to such an organi-
zation, purchase tickets for political party dinners or other functions, or attend
political gatherings. An exception is made for a judge holding an office filled
by election between competing candidates or a candidate for such office, 4
allowing him, insofar as permitted by law, to attend political gatherings, speak
to such gatherings on his own behalf where he is a candidate for election or
re-election, and contribute to a political party or organization. A judge who
becomes a candidate for non-judicial elective office other than as a delegate to
a state constitutional convention should resign his office.
During the campaign, the candidate for elective judicial office' should main-
tain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and endeavor to require the
same standards of members of his family and those under his control. While
he may not himself solicit funds or public support, he may, if he has active
opposition, establish a committee to do so, provided it functions only for a
fixed brief time" before and after the election. Such funds and support may be
solicited by the committee from lawyers, but, of course, none of the funds
should be used by the judge for his personal purposes or those of his family.
The commentary suggests that unless public filing is required by law, the
names of the contributors should not be revealed to the judge.
There are two other sections to the Code, one dealing with compliance and
the other with the effective date of compliance. The first requires compliance by
all judges, which includes any officer of a judicial system performing a judicial
function, including referees in bankruptcy, special masters, court commissioners,
and magistrates. In the case of full-time judges, this requirement is unqualified.
However, part-time judges are relieved from the restrictions on outside re-
munerative activities." A part-time judge may not practice law in any court
upon which he serves or before a court which is subject to the appellate juris-
diction of the court upon which he sits, and, further, he should not act as a
lawyer in any proceeding in which he has served as a judge, or any proceeding
related thereto. A judge pro tempore--one who is appointed to act temporarily
-is relieved of the same restrictions and also those requiring him to handle
73Allowing the judge's name to appear on the same ticket is not a public endorsement.
74This eliminates judges holding office under the "Missouri Plan" and its variations,
which, to varying degrees, provide for the evaluation of a judge's work. See Traynor, Who
Can Best Judge the Judges?, 53 VA. L. REv. 1266, 1277 (1967).
7 This includes offices filled by election under the "Missouri Plan" or its variations.
7' The Code suggests 90 days, but the figure is bracketed. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(2).
"Id. Canon 5C(2), D-G.
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his investments so as to minimize the possibility of disqualification.M He should
not, however, act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he has participated as
a judge, or in any related proceeding. A retired judge receiving full compen-
sation, but subject to recall, may accept appointment to governmental com-
mittees or commissions concerned with issues of fact or policy,T so long as he
refrains from judicial service while doing so; otherwise, he is considered a full-
time judge. All other retired judges subject to recall are considered part-time
judges. A retired judge not subject to recall is by definition not a judge.
The final section of the Code requires compliance with its provisions as
soon as reasonably possible. Yet it permits, if the demands on his time and the
possibility of conflicts of interest are not substantial, a judge who holds office
on the effective date of the Code to continue to act as an officer, director, or
non-legal advisor of a family business, or as executor, administrator, trustee,
or other fiduciary for the estate or person of one not a member of the judge's
family.-0
On August 16, 1972, the final draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct was
presented for approval to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation at its annual meeting in San Francisco. After full discussion, it was
adopted by unanimous vote with only two minor changes for purposes of clari-
fication, both accepted by the drafting committee.81 Thus, the Code of Judicial
Conduct became the official expression by the American Bar Association of its
views on the public activities of the members of the judiciary.
But this is only the beginning. As a mere suggestion by the bar, the Code
is obviously ineffectual until adopted by the judges themselves in such form
as to be capable of enforcement. Ordinarily, this would be by rule of court of
each of the state judicial systems and of the federal system. Accordingly, im-
mediately following the approval of the Code, a member of the drafting com-
mittee moved that a special committee of twelve members be created to secure
adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct in each of these jurisdictions. This
motion also passed without dissent.
When the task of this committee has been accomplished, then through the
joint efforts of bench and bar, specific standards will have been established for
the public conduct of judges. Not only should this serve to restore public
confidence in the judiciary, but it should be beneficial to the judges themselves
in affording them guidelines against inadvertent transgressions. Then perhaps
781d. Canon 5C(3).
" Canon 5G prohibits such service by full-time judges.
"0This is derived from § 10 of the preliminary draft. Canon 5D permits a judge to serve
in a similar capacity for a member of his family under limited circumstances.
" In Canon 3A(7) at the suggestion of media representatives the word "immediately"
was inserted before the word "adjacent," and the Code was presented with this single change.
From the floor a representative of the Conference of State Attorneys General offered three
amendments which on vote were rejected. These would have added the word "employee"
to Canon 3C(1) (d) (i), defined the civil law system of determining relationship under
Canon 3C(3) (a), and clarified a suggested contradiction between the definition of a "finan-
cial interest" as "a legal or equitable interest, however small" and the reference to a financial
interest as "insubstantial" in Canon 3D. An additional suggestion from the floor that the
words "or judge" be added following the word "lawyer" in Canon 3B(3) was accepted by
the Committee.
2 Mr. Whitney North Seymour of New York.
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the ancient precedent' prefixed to the original Canons of Judicial Ethics will
at last find its fulfillment: "The place of justice is a hallowed place; and there-
fore not only the Bench, but the foot pace and precincts and purprise thereof
ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption." 4
The "Ancient Precedents," as a part of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, were reprinted
in ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS OF THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES (1957), but not in the subsequent replacement volume, ABA
OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1967). There appears to be no authority for this
omission other than the whim of the editor.
"4Bacon, Of Judicature in ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Ancient Precedents.
[Vol. 26
